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Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACr-IN CAMERA
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMED EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURE
MUST DETAIL THE REASONS FOR THE CLAIMED EXEMPTION
FOR EACH DOCUMENT SOUGHT.

Lame v. United States Department of Justice (1981)

Anthony Lame, a Philadelphia television reporter, planned to write
a book about the "new" FBI, dealing primarily with the federal prosecution of two local politicians.' In November 1978, Lame requested
access to Justice Department files on these prosecutions 2 under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).3 Lame subsequently changed his
request, narrowing it to documents detailing FBI interviews with various
persons, some of whom he named.4 The FBI informed Lame that all of
the requested materials were exempt from disclosure under the FOIA's
privacy and confidentiality provisions of the investigatory records exemption. 5

After exhausting his administrative remediesA Lame sought de novo
1. 654 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1981). The focus of the book was to be the
successful prosecution of two former members the Pennsylvania legislature-

Representative Herbert Fineman and Senator Henry Cianfrani, both Democrats
from Philadelphia. Id. at 919. Mr. Fineman was convicted on two counts of
obstruction of justice. Id. at 919 n.l. Mr. Cianfrani entered pleas of guilty
or nolo con'tendere on charges of mail fraud, obstruction of justice, interstate
racketeering, and income tax evasion. Id. at 919.
2. Id.
3. Id. The FOIA mandates that federal agencies release documents and
records requested by the public, so long as the information is not exempt from
disclosure under the Act. See The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976). For a discussion of the FOIA, see notes 19 g- 20 and accompanying
text infra.
4. 654 F.2d at 919. Lame specifically requested forms known as FD-302s
(302s) which are FBI interview forms used to "record information which may
later become testimony." Id. For the most part, Lame named the individuals
whose 302s he requested. Id. However, he also requested 302s of the following
classes: all other officials of Jefferson Medical College; all other state legislators and/or state officials in Fineman's file; and any other officials of the University of Pennsylvania in Cianfrani's file. Id. at 919 n.2. The FBI refused to
respond until Lame sent them notarized authorizations of those persons whose
302s he sought. Id. at 919. Lame demanded a ruling on his request without
the authorizations. Id.
5. Id. For the text of the privacy and confidentiality exemptions, see
note 26 infra.
6. 654 F.2d at 919. Lame appealed to the Department of Justice's Office
of Privacy and Information Appeals which affirmed the FBI's decision. Id.

(597)
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review 7 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania 8 and both parties filed motions for summary judgment.9
The district court found that the affidavits accompanying the respective
motions 10 provided an inadequate record on which to grant or deny
The FOIA provision indicating what steps are needed to exhaust one's administrative remedies provides in relevant part:
Any person making a request to any agency for records . . . shall
be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the applicable
time limit provisions of this paragraph. If the Government can show
exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due
diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the
records. Upon any determination by an agency to comply with a
request for records, the records shall be made promptly available to
such person making such request.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976).
7. 654 F.2d at 919. The FOIA provides for de novo review of an agency's
refusal to fully or partially comply with a request for documents when the
requester has exhausted his administrative remedies or the agency has not met
the time limit requirements of the Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976).
The provision providing for de novo review reads in relevant part:
On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has
jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records
and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine
the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency
records in camera to determine whether such records or any part
thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to
sustain its action.
Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
8. 654 F.2d at 919. Lame then sought responses to three sets of interrogatories and filed two requests for production of documents. Id. When the
FBI refused to comply with Lame's requests for discovery, Lame moved to compel discovery, and the FBI countered by seeking a protective order. Id.
Neither of these motions was ruled on by the district court. Id.
9. Id.
10. In the affidavit accompanying its motion for summary judgment, the
FBI refused to confirm or deny the existence of the requested 302s because
"[r]evelation of such nonpublic information would place the source in danger
of just the types of possible criticism, public harassment, social ostracism, or
even physical injury the privacy and confidentiality exemptions of the FOIA
are designed to prevent." Id. at 919, 926. Cases in which the withholding
agency refuses to confirm or deny the existence of the requested documents
have been labelled "extraordinary" cases. See note 55 and accompanying text
infra. The FBI's affidavit also mentioned the need to protect the privacy of
any third parties mentioned in the 302s. 654 F.2d at 926. Lame's affidavit
countered that because most of what he sought was public knowledge, the
privacy and confidentiality exemptions should not apply. Id. at 920. Lame
ad compiled the list of 302s by reviewing Representative Fineman's trial
transcript, a related prosecution of Martin Abrams, and the Change of Plea
Memorandum filed in Senator Cianfrani's prosecution. Id.
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summary judgment 11 and allowed the government thirty days to supplement the record.' 2 The government did so by submitting an in camera
14
affidavit 13 to which samples of the requested documents were attached.
On the basis of the in camera affidavit, the district court found that the
FOIA's privacy and confidentiality provisions were applicable 15 and
granted summary judgment for the government. 16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 17 reversed
and remanded,' 8 holding that the applicability of the claimed privacy
and confidentiality provisions of the FOIA's investigatory records ex11. 654 F.2d at 920.
12. Id.
13. Id. The FOIA provides that in camera examination of agency records
may be conducted by the trial court. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). For the
relevant text of § 552(a)(4)(B), see note 7 supra. In camera means "[iln
chambers; in private." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that with the exception of an actual
trial on the merits, "[a]ll other acts or proceedings may be done or conducted
by a judge in chambers, without the attendance of the clerk or other court
officials .... .
FED. R. Civ. P. 77(b). The in camera provision was added to
the FOIA under the 1974 Amendments. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93502, § l(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1562 (1974).
14. 654 F.2d at 920. The government's in camera affidavit reiterated the
exemption claims and discussed generally the invasion of privacy issue with
regard to interviewees and third parties. Id. The government claimed that
express or implied assurances of confidentiality had been given to the interviewees to obtain the 302s. Id. In addition, the government specifically
discussed the sample 302s which were attached to the affidavit. Id. This
affidavit also served as the FBI's first admission on the record that any of the
302s did exist. Id. at 926.
15. Id. at 920. In applying the privacy exemption, the district court
balanced "the public interest in learning about FBI techniques" against the
"embarrassment, harassment, and risk to personal safety that revelation of an
interviewee's role might cause." Id. In finding the confidentiality exemption
applicable, the district court made no findings as to whether the FBI had
given express assurances of confidentiality or whether assurances of confidentiality could have been implied under the circumstances. Id. For a discussion
of the necessity of these assurances, see note 32 infra.
16. 654 F.2d at 920.
17. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Adams and Garth and Senior
District Judge Dumbauld of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Judge Garth wrote the majority opinion and judge Dumbauld concurred in part and dissented in part.
18. Id. at 928. Because the privacy provision of the FOIA involves a balancing test, the Lame court held that each of the 302s sought must be made
available to the court and the government must explain why "disclosure would
result in embarrassment or harassment either to the individual interviewed or to
third parties" with regard to each of the 302s. Id. The government's affidavits
should also address the impact of the Fineman trial and the Cianfrani Change
of Plea Proceedings on the privacy issue. Id. The court also held that when
the government chooses to claim an exemption under the confidentiality provision, it must provide enough "detailed explanations" to allow the court to
find that assurances of confidentiality, express or implied, were given to each
source at the time of the interview. Id. These explanations must include "a
discussion of the impact of any subsequent public disclosures made by the
source." Id. For a discussion of the privacy and confidentiality provisions, see
notes 30-48 and accompanying text infra.
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emption must be determined on the basis of affidavits which set forth in
detail the grounds for the exemption with respect to each of the requested documents. Lame v. United States Department of Justice, 654
F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA 19 provides for the prompt response of
federal agencies to requests for information which is not protected by
20
If a request for documents pursuant to the
the Act's nine exceptions.
19. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250-51 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
552 (1976)). The FOIA was signed into law by President Lydon B. Johnson
on July 4, 1966 "with a deep sense of pride that the United States is an open
society in which the people's right to know is cherished and guarded." Excerpt
from President Johnson's bill-signing statement, reprinted in STAFFS OF HOUSE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974
(P.L. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DocuMENTS 8 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK]. The
FOIA was enacted to embody the ideal that "an informed electorate is vital
to the proper operation of a democracy" and to promote "a general philosophy
of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language." See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). The
FOIA was enacted as an amendment to § 3, the public disclosure section, of
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946. Before amendment, § 3 of
the APA stated that "matters of official record shall . . . be made available to
persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential
for good cause found." Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 230 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). This section of the APA ultimately
served to prevent disclosure of information, although it was designed to promote it. H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra, at 9. Other than § 3 of the APA, the only federal "disclosure"
provision prior to the FOIA was a 1958 amendment to the 1789 "housekeeping"
statute which gave federal agencies the authority to set up filing systems and
to keep records. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). This amendment to the "housekeeping" statute provides: "This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public."
This amendment has largely been ignored. H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d
Id.
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 9.
In construing the FOIA, the United States Supreme Court has said that
"[w]ithout question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access
to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information
from possibly unwilling official hands." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).

§

20. The exemption portion of the 1966 statute provided, in pertinent
part:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to matters
that are (1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy; (2) related
solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency; (3)
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from any person and
privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a private
party in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by
law to a private party; (8) contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the
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FOIA is made to the appropriate agency 21 and the agency refuses disclosure, the party requesting the information may bring an action in
federal district court to compel disclosure. 22 The agency then has the
burden of proving that the material at issue falls within one or more of
the Act's exceptions. 28
One of the nine exceptions is for "investigatory files compiled for
use of any agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information
and data (including maps) concerning wells.
Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 251 (1966)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1976)). For the text of the amended
versions of subsections (1)and (7), see note 26 infra. The Court has noted
that the "clearly delineated" statutory exceptions to full disclosure reflect "that
disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act" and these exceptions are to be narrowly construed by the courts. Department of the Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). See generally Webster, An FBI Viewpoint
Regarding the Freedom of Information Act, 7 J. LEcis 7 (1980); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exceptions, 62 GEO. L.J.
177 (1973); Note, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpretations,44 WASH. L. REv. 641 (1969).
21. Under the Act, an agency "as defined in section 551(l) . . . includes
any executive department, military departments, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch
of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any
independent regulatory agency."
5 U.S.C. §552(e) (1976). Section 551(1)
provides:
"[A]gency" means each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency, but does not include(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United
States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia; or except as to
the requirements of section 552 of this title;
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined
by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in
occupied territory.
Id. §551(l).
22. See id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
note 7 supra.

For the text of the jurisdictional section, see

23. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
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law enforcement purposes." 24 As amended in 1974, this exemption 25
has several subsections defining its scope, 26 including provisions which
prevent disclosure of records whose release would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy," 27 or "disclose the identity of a confidential
24. See id. § 552(b)(7). For the text of this exemption, see note 26 infra.
These investigatory records have been further defined as " 'the files prepared
Committee on
by Government agencies to prosecute law violators.'"
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted),
quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). In Masonic Homes,
the Third Circuit held that this exemption could not apply to union authorization cards submitted in support of a petition for a representation election. 556
F.2d at 218. Such records, the court stated, "must relate to some type of
formal proceeding, and one that is pending." Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).
See also Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438
F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1977). In Congressional News, the court held that journalists could obtain copies of ledger sheets listing contributors to and recipients
of an illegal campaign fund. Id. The court noted that even though the ledger
sheets were not compiled by law enforcement personnel but by the partici.
pants themselves, they were investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes. Id. at 542. The court stated: "It is sufficient that the ledger sheets
in question became a part of the [government] files in the course of the criminal
investigation." Id. Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that "[e]xemption 7 is not rendered unavailable by the
termination of the active investigation" relating to the documents at issue.
Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). For a discussion of the scope of the
phrase "law enforcement purposes," see note 24 and accompanying text supra.
26. See Act of Nov. 21. 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1563
(1974). Exemptions (1) and (7) were amended as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order.
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A)
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of
a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,
or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures,
or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(7) (1976).

The amendment to exemption 7 was "intended

to counteract judicial expansion of the investigatory files exemption."

Con-

gressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538,
541 (D.D.C. 1977) (citations omitted).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976). For further discussion of this exemption, see notes 29-31 and accompanying text infra.
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source." 28 When the privacy provision of the investigatory records
exemption is asserted, 29 courts have generally adopted a balancing approach in which the invasion of a party's privacy is weighed against the
benefits of disclosure to the public. 0
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976). For further discussion of this exemption, see notes 31-45 and accompanying text infra.
29. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976). For the text of this provision, see
note 26 supra.
30. See Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Sands v. Murphy, 633 F.2d 968, 971 n.4 (1st Cir. 1980); Maroscia v.
Levy, 569 F.2d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1977); Lamont v. Department of Justice,
475 F. Supp. 761, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The balancing test which has been
applied to the privacy provision of the investigatory records exemption evolved
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of another exemption under the
FOIA. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). In
Rose, the Court construed the exemption which prevents disclosure of personnel files that would constitute a dearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. Id. at 370-71, citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970). In upholding the
claimed exemption, the Court noted that by enacting § 552(b)(6), "Congress
sought to construct an exemption that would require a balancing of the individual's right of privacy against the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' " 425 U.S. at
372. The Third Circuit has also adopted this balancing test for § 552(b)(6).
See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1977);
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1974).
This test was extended to the investigatory records privacy exemption
by the Fourth Circuit in Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th
Cir. 1977). The Irving court pointed out that "the difference in the text of
the subsections suggests that greater weight should be given to the claim of
privacy when exemption 7C is invoked." Id. at 1136 n.7. The Fourth Circuit held that the privacy interests of back pay claimants, who had already
made or would soon make public much of the information in their files, was
outweighed by the public interest for the novel reason that 30 law review
articles had been written about the case over its 20-year history and also
because the case served as an "indicator" of the workings of the National
Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1136.
As with any balancing approach, the result will largely depend on the
particular facts and circumstances of the case involved. Compare Lamont v.
Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) with Congressional
News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C.
1977). In Lamont, the invasion of privacy was found unwarranted because
the release of FBI documents to the requester might have caused "embarrassment or harassment to the third party" and would therefore be detrimental
to the public's interest in having the future cooperation of third parties with
FBI investigators. 475 F. Supp. at 777. In Congressional News, the district
court found that the balance tipped in favor of disclosure. 438 F. Supp. at 543.
The records sought were lists of unreported campaign contributions, including
the names of contributors and recipients who were in violation of a federal
statute. Id. The court found that the violators had assumed the risk that
their privacy would be invaded. Id. at 544.
Other courts have endorsed a "threshold" inquiry as to whether an invasion of privacy would actually occur before analyzing the competing interests.
Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (M.D. Tenn.
1975). See also Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 220
(3d Cir. 1977). Courts may also consider factors such as "the use to which the
requesting party would put the information" and "the degree to which the
requesting party could obtain the material sought from an alternative source."
Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp.
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If an agency relies on the confidential source prong of the exemption, 3' the agency must prove that there existed, at the time it obtained
32
the information, an express or implied assurance of confidentiality.
Unlike the invasion of privacy prong,33 the courts do not require a
balancing of interests when analyzing this provision. 34 Instead, once it
is determined that a source is confidential, his name or any other identifying information is deleted from the documents requested.35
at 542 n.20. And the Third Circuit has stated that it "will stop short of saying there is no public interest to be balanced . . . because the presumption
is in favor of disclosure." Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d
214, 220 (3rd Cir. 1977).
It should be noted that even though one portion of a document may be
exempt, it does not necessarily follow that all of the document will be. See
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). As amended in 1974, the FOIA now states that "[a]ny
reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt." Id.

§ 552(b).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976). For the text of this provision, see note
26 supra.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 19, at 230.
The requirement of proving confidentiality was explained by the drafters of the amendment as follows: "[T]he
identity of a person other than a paid informer may be protected if the per-

son provided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in
circumstances from which such an assurance can be reasonably inferred." Id.
See also Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1980) (proof can be made
through "understood custom of confidentiality"); Lesar v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (averment of explicit understanding of confidentiality is sufficient); Maroscia v. Levy, 569 F.2d 1000, 1002
(7th Cir. 1977) ("clear" that FBI interviews could only be obtained with
assurances of confidentiality); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131,
1137 (4th Cir. 1977) (whether confidentiality exists is a question of fact);
Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (confidentiality found where disclosure of source would cause "severe detriment"
to source). A few courts have noted that assurances of confidentiality given
at the time the information is obtained are not necessarily affected by any
subsequent public disclosures (e.g., trial testimony) by the confidential source.
See Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that subsequent court proceedings, news leaks, and other FOIA requests do not constitute a "waiver" of confidentiality); Scherer v. Kelley, 584
F.2d 170, 176 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[t]he nontestimonial information may be far
more damaging than any testimony freely given and may place the source in
great peril" and revelation of the confidential source would discourage future
public cooperation).
33. For a discussion of the privacy exemption and the required balancing
analysis, see notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
34. See Sands v. Murphy, 633 F.2d 968, 971 (1st Cir. 1980). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra

note 19, at 230. The House Committee noted that "in every case where the
investigatory records sought were compiled for law enforcement purposeseither civil or criminal in nature-the agency can withhold the names, addresses,
and other information that would reveal the identity of a confidential source
who furnished the information." Id. (emphasis added).
35. See Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979); Terkel
v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1979); Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The documents requested can be
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One aspect of the confidentiality provision, which allows an exemption for information supplied by a confidential source when that
information is gathered in criminal or national security investigations, 6
has engendered a disparity of interpretation.3 7 The crux of the controversy is whether this provision provides blanket protection for all information supplied by confidential sources 38 or whether some information can be disclosed. 39
made available, after necessary deletions are made, in "reasonably segregable
portion[s] in accordance with § 552(b).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976). For the text of the confidentiality provision, see note 26 supra.
37. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text infra.
38. See Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (all information provided by a confidential source is exempt); Terkel v.
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979) (agency can withhold confidential information supplied by a confidential source). When Senator Hart proposed his
amendment to § 552(b)(7), debate in the Congress centered largely "on the
danger that paid informants and civic-minded citizens would no longer supply
information to the FBI." Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1980).
While the changes were being considered by a House-Senate Conference Committee, President Ford expressed this same concern and was informed, in a
letter from Senator Kennedy and Representative Moorhead, that the Committee had modified the amendment to § 552(b)(7) "to permit the withholding of
the information provided by a confidential source to a criminal law enforcement authority" during a criminal investigation. Id., quoting 120 CONG. REC,
33,159 (1974). This language of the modified amendment was adopted. See
note 26 supra. Later, in the debate surrounding the override of President
Ford's veto, Senator Hart stated: "The agency not only can withhold information which would disclose the identity of a confidential source but also can
provide blanket protection for any information supplied by a confidential
source." 120 CONG. REc. 36,871 (1974) (emphasis added), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 19, at 451.
Senator Byrd likewise stated that the amendment as adopted protected "all of the information furnished by a confidential
source to a criminal law enforcement agency" if obtained during a criminal
investigation. SOURCE BooK, supra note 19, at 468.
39. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States Dep't of Justice,
612 F.2d 417, 428 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding the lower court's application of
exemption (7)(D) because the district court had required "the government to
show that the confidential information was only furnished by a confidential
source and during the course of a criminal investigation"); Nix v. United States,
572 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1978) ((7)(D) protects confidential information
"when furnished only by a confidential source, whether one or more"); Lamont
v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (exemption will
be sustained ifmaterial sought "is confidential information furnished only by
the confidential sources or might identify the source if revealed to plaintiff").
A plain reading of the statute indicates that information provided by a confidential source may be disclosed if: 1) that same information has been provided by a nonconfidential source and the information is segregable; or 2) disclosure would not reveal the identity of the confidential source. For the
rationale supporting this view, see note 45 infra. The conference committee
which proposed the 1974 amendment to the FOIA may have obfuscated the
scope of the confidentiality provision through the language of its Joint Explanatory Statement that "where the records are compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority, all of the information furnished only by a confidential
source may be withheld -if the information was compiled in the course of a
criminal investigation." See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974)
(emphasis in original), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 19, at 230. The
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The courts that have been confronted with this issue are divided

on its resolution.4 0 Relying to a great extent on the legislative history
of the confidentiality provision, 41 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Lesar v. United States Department of Justice 42
explained that once it has been ascertained that information was furnished by a confidential source, "all such information obtained from the
confidential source receives protection." 43 The Fourth Circuit in Nix
v. United States 44 has adopted a different approach under which discourts that have construed the confidentiality provision to provide blanket
protection for information supplied by a confidential source have focused on
the committee's emphasis on the word "all" instead of "only." See Lesar v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For further
discussion of whether some disclosure may be permitted, see note 45 infra.
40. For cases espousing "blanket protection" for all information provided
by a confidential source during a criminal investigation, see notes 42-43 and
accompanying text infra. For cases adopting the "plain meaning of the statute" view, and permitting some disclosure, see notes 44-48 and accompanying
text infra.
41. For a discussion of the legislative history, see notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
42. 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Lesar, the FOIA request was for
reports and memoranda dealing with the FBI's surveillance and investigation
of Martin Luther King, Jr. Id. Included in this material were Atlanta and
Memphis police department records dealing with Dr. King's assassination. Id.
at 488. The FBI contended that these records were supplied to it "with the
explicit understanding that these documents would remain confidential." Id.
at 491.
43. Id. at 492 (footnote omitted). The court cited Senator Hart's "blanket
protection" language in support of its position. Id. at 492 n.l14. For Senator
Hart's statement, see note 38 supra.
The Seventh Circuit is in apparent agreement with the Lesar court on
this issue. See Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979). Louis
"Studs" Terkel sought copies of all the records maintained by the FBI under
his name. Id. at 215. The FBI released 146 pages of records, but withheld
others in accordance with claimed exemptions under the FOIA, including
§ 552(b)(7). The court found that with respect to all but three of the documents withheld, the FBI had offered sufficient justification for its nondisclosures. Id. at 217. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court for
in camera consideration of these three documents to determine whether, after
any identifying names or symbols were deleted, release of the documents would
reveal the identities of confidential informers. Id. at 217-18. Although the
Terkel court did not squarely address the question, it stated: "[I]t is noteworthy that under subparagraph (D) the agency can withhold not only the
identity of the source but also the 'confidential information' that he supplies."
Id. As authority for this, the Seventh Circuit also cited Senator Hart's statement about "blanket protection." Id.
44. 572 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978). Nix was a prisoner who alleged he was
gassed and beaten without provocation by several guards. Id. at 1000. In his
FOIA request, he sought two letters written to the FBI about the incident by
four fellow inmates; reports of FBI interviews with 30 persons including inmates, guards, and a supervisor; and a physician's statement to the FBI. Id.
at 1000-01. One of the inmates consented to the FBI's release of his interview
record. Id. at 1001. This document was released to Nix with deletions of the
names of guards the inmate had mentioned. Id. Nix contended that because
his interview with the FBI and the inmate's interview contained much the
same information as the confidential interviews of other inmates, this was not
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closure of information not provided solely by the confidential source is
45
permitted if disclosure does not identify the source.
Most of the FOIA litigation that has been argued before the circuit
courts has been on appeal from summary judgment. 40 Therefore, the
47
It is
record generally consists only of the affidavits of the parties.
from these affidavits that the district court must determine whether the
48
agency has sustained its burden of proof as to any claimed exemptions.
order in camera
The district judge may also, as a matter of discretion,
49
review of some or all of the documents in question.
information provided only by a confidential source and was, therefore, subject to
disclosure. Id. at 1004.
45. Id. The court noted that the confidentiality provision has two
"phases."

Id.

Although the court conceded that the FBI was refusing to

disclose confidential
two nonconfidential
of his interview), it
this provision. Id.

information that had already been provided to it by
sources (Nix and the inmate who consented to the release
refused to compel disclosure because of the first phase of
at 1004-05. Release of the letters and interviews sought

by Nix, the court said, posed a "substantial risk" that the identities of the
sources would be disclosed. Id. Similarly, in Lamont v. Department of
Justice, 475 F.2d 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court held that it would sustain
"claims of exemption where the context of the materials bears out the assertion
that it is confidential information furnished only by the confidential sources or
might identify the source if revealed to the plaintiff." Id. at 780. But see
Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Senator Hart's language about "blanket protection" for information supplied by a confidential
source). In both Nix and Lamont, the courts have implicitly advocated a twoprong test for confidential records obtained in a criminal investigation: 1)
whether any of the information provided by the confidential source has been
provided by another source; and 2) if so, whether disclosure of that portion of
the information would tend to reveal the identity of the confidential source.
See Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d at 1004; Lamont v. Department of Justice,
475 F. Supp. at 779-80.
The Ninth Circuit has also endorsed a literal reading of the language of
the confidentiality provision. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 428 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding the lower
court's application of exemption (7)(D) because the district court had required
"the government to show that the confidential information was only furnished
by a confidential source and during the course of a criminal investigation").
46. See, e.g., Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Sands v. Murphy, 633 F.2d 968, 969 (1st Cir. 1980); Keeney
v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1980); Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383,
1385 (5th Cir. 1979); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 215 (7th Cir. 1979);
Maroscia v. Levi, 560 F.2d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 1977); Committee on Masonic
Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1977). Where there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the question to be decided is one of law, summary
judgment is proper. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Professor Moore has noted
that claims in the district court arising under the FOIA may be appropriate
for summary judgment See 6 Pt. 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.17[76]

(Supp. 1981-82).
56.15[8] (2d ed. 1976).
47. See 6 Pt. 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
Summary judgment may be rendered by affidavit alone or accompanied by

other documents. Id.
48. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).

The burden of proof in de novo

review is on the agency under § 552(a)(4)(B) of the FOIA. Id. For the text
of this provision, see note 7 supra.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). For the relevant text of the statute and a
discussion of in camera review, see notes 7 & 13 and accompanying text supra.
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Although there is no universal standard for the form and content
of these affidavits, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Vaughn v. Rosen,50 devised a formula which has become
known as the "Vaughn index." '
This index consists of an affidavit
which correlates portions of the documents sought with the government's
detailed justifications for withholding them through the use of crossreferences. 52 However, in a case in which the government claims it
can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the documents, a detailed
public affidavit containing specific references to documents is impracSee also Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d
417, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1979); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1002 (4th Cir.
1978). In Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the criterion is "whether the district judge believes that in
camera inspection is needed in order to make a responsible de novo determina.
tion on the claims of exemption." Id. at 1195.
50. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1979). Vaughn,
a law professor, sought access to documents evaluating the personnel management of programs of certain agencies. 484 F.2d at 822.
51. 484 F.2d at 827. The court found it "impossible" to determine from
the "scant record" whether the information sought was exempt from disclosure
as claimed by the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 822. The "sole support"
for the government's claimed exemptions was an affidavit of the Director of
the Bureau of Personnel Management Evaluation setting forth the Director's
opinion in conclusory terms. Id. at 823. The court also noted that the district court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment without
giving its reasons. Id. at 822 n.2.
52. Id. The Vaughn court reasoned that this type of index would provide a better basis than any previous form of affidavit for opposing counsel
to propound objections for the district court to rule on, and for the appellate
court to review. Id. at 827. The court also emphasized that the index would
alleviate some of the difficulties of in camera review, particularly when a large
number of documents must be examined. Id. at 825. The court further noted
that if such an examination was involved, a special master could be appointed
at the trial court's discretion. Id. at 828. In discussing the benefits of the
index, the court highlighted the fact that in camera examination "isnecessarily
without benefit of criticism and illumination by a party with the actual interest
in forcing disclosure." Id. at 825. Although the Vaughn court recognized
that its requirements "may impose a substantial burden on the agency seeking
to avoid disclosure," the court stressed that the FOIA specifically places the
burden of proof as to the claimed exemption on the agency. Id. at 828.
The Vaughn index has been adopted by the Third Circuit. See Ferri v.
Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1222 (3d Cir. 1981) vacated, reh. granted, opinion reinstated with modifications not relevant to the issues herein, No. 78-0841 (filed
Feb. 24, 1982); Coastal Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 972
(3d Cir. 1981). Other courts have favored requirements which are similar to
those involved in the Vaughn index. See Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 116
(2d Cir. 1980) (affidavits should comprise a "comprehensive index"); Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 428 (9th
Cir. 1979) (district court reviewed each document step by step and "had the
government's attorneys explain the grounds urged in support of the exclusions"); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1979) ("document-bydocument" index); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1979) ("bare conclusory allegations" by government will not suffice).
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ticable. 53 Thus, in Phillippi v. CIA,54 a variation of the Vaughn index
was formulated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit for dealing with such extraordinary cases. 5 5 In Phillippi, the
court held that an agency is still required to prepare a public affidavit 51
justifying its refusal to confirm or deny the existence of the documents,
but only "in as much detail as possible." 17 Thereafter, the district court
may examine in camera any further detailed affidavits or documents, or
both, as is necessary for a fair adjudication.5 8
In Lame v. United States Department of Justice,59 the Third Circuit
addressed the question of the proper procedure to be employed by a
district court when an agency refuses to confirm or deny the existence of
53. Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
54. 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 1013. Phillippi was a journalist who sought disclosure of
CIA documents which allegedly detailed the CIA's attempts to convince the
media to withhold publications concerning the Hughes Glomar Explorer. Id.
at 1011. The CIA denied the request, claiming that if such records did indeed
exist, they would be exempt from disclosure under § 552(b)(1) and (3) of the
FOIA. Id. For the text of these exemptions, see notes 20 & 26 supra. The
CIA further claimed that it could not confirm or deny whether these records
existed, for this in itself would constitute an unauthorized disclosure. 546
F.2d at 1011, citing the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3)
(1970). Phillippi then filed a complaint in district court and moved to require
the CIA to provide a Vaughn index for each document withheld. 546 F.2d
at 1012. With its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the government submitted two sealed affidavits-one "secret" and the other "top secret."
Id. On its own motion to submit relevant material to the court for in camera inspection, the government filed a public affidavit which explained that all information relevant to its case was "classified." Id. The district court considered
in camera only the sealed affidavits and granted the CIA's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
56. 546 F.2d at 1013. The court noted that the public affidavit would still
allow for testing by the party requesting the document, who could then resort to
discovery to "clarify the Agency's position or to identify the procedures by
which that position was established." Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added). The Phillippi court emphasized the necessity
of having the agency's rationale for its refusal to confirm or deny the existencc
of documents clarified before the district court can proceed to in camera examination. Id. The court stated: "Since the 'document' the Agency is currently asserting the right to withhold is confirmation or denial of the existence
of the requested records, we stress that we are not requiring, at this stage, the
Vaughn index .
I..."
Id. at 1013 n.7.
58. Id. at 1013. The court suggested that "the District Court may have to
examine classified affidavits in camera and without participation by plaintiff's
counsel." Id. For cases dealing with the role of in camera review in FOIA
cases, see note 49 and accompanying text supra. The Phillippi approach has
been adopted by the Third Circuit. See Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1224 (3d
Cir.), vacated, reh. granted, opinion reinstated with modifications not relevant
to the issues herein, No. 78-0841 (filed Feb. 24, 1982). In Ferri, the Third
Circuit stated that "if the agency is unable to articulate publicly the specific
disclosure it fears and the specific harm that would ensue, then in camera inspection of a more detailed affidavit must be resorted to." 645 F.2d at 1224 (citation omitted).
59. 654 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
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requested documents on the basis of the invasion of privacy and con6°
fidential source provisions of the investigatory records exemption.
Judge Garth initially examined the basic procedures involved in FOIA
cases 61 and then analyzed the nature and application of the privacy 62
and confidentiality provisions.6 3 The majority aligned itself with the
Lesar court 64 in concluding that a finding of confidentiality would exempt from disclosure all of the confidential information given by a confidential source.6
Judge Garth next examined the public affidavit submitted by the
60. Id. at 925. The Lame court phrased the issue as follows:
Whether taking into account the nature of the exemptions claimed,
the procedure employed by the district court in the instant case was
correct where the FBI claimed it could neither admit nor deny the

existence of the requested interview forms for fear of breaching confidential relationships or invading privacy interests.
Id.

61. Id. at 920. The majority first noted the underlying goals of the FOIA
and the standard statutory implementation of these goals. Id. at 920-21. Judge
Garth then noted the Third Circuit's adoption of the procedure of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Vaughn and Phillippi. Id.
at 921. He concluded that "under ordinary circumstances a Vaughn index ...
will generally suffice," but that in "special" circumstances the government's
public response will be "limited to an argument as to why no detailed information may be provided publicly." Id. at 922. In either case, Judge Garth
stated, the government must provide the district court with detailed justifications for nondisclosure and allow the district court, at its discretion, to inspect
all the materials claimed to be exempt. Id.
62. Id. Judge Garth noted that the balancing which has been utilized
for the privacy provision must be applied to each document and to each portion
of each document. Id. at 923. He further reasoned that in conducting the
balancing test, the district court must consider any "information given by
testimony at trial or in other public proceedings" because this might show
that the "privacy interest is substantially less compelling than might otherwise
be assumed." Id.
63. Id. The majority noted that the confidentiality provision requires no
balancing. Id. Judge Garth then traced the legislative history of this provision.
The court also noted that "[w]hether there is an express or implied assurance
of confidentiality is a question of fact to be determined with regard to each
source." Id. judge Garth also observed that subsequent disclosure of the
confidential information "does not render non-confidential any of the information originally provided." Id. at 925. However, he further stated that subsequent disclosure may constitute evidence relevant to the question of whether
assurances of confidentiality were ever given. Id.
64. Id.
supra.

For a discussion of Lesar, see notes 42-43 and accompanying text

65. 654 F.2d at 924.

The majority rejected the "plain reading of the

statute argument on the grounds that such an interpretation was "not supported by the legislative history and the case law." Id. The court traced the
language of the Senate debates on the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, includ-

ing Senator Hart's remarks concerning "blanket protection" for confidential
sources. Id. at 924-25. For a discussion of the legislative history of the FOIA,
see note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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FBI 66 and determined that it did not meet the Vaughn standard of
detail6 7 However, Judge Garth concluded that, due to the unique circumstances of the case,6 s the Vaughn index standard could not be employed 9 and that the public affidavit was sufficient to meet the standard
of Phillippi.7O Consequently, the majority stated that the district court
was correct in "not requiring a further public articulation" and in pro71
ceeding to examine the in camera submissions.
In its analysis of the sufficiency of the in camera submissions, the
Lame court concluded that the district court did not have the requisite
information to rule on the claimed exemptions since the private affidavit
was not "as extensive as the public explanation required under
Vaughn" 72 and the district court did not have available to it all of the
requested documents. 73 Judge Garth stated that "[e]ach document and
its asserted exemption must be individually explained in terms of privacy or confidentiality." 74 To satisfy the requirements for the privacy
exemption, explanations that would allow the court enough information
66. 654 F.2d at 925. For the contents of this affidavit, see note 10 supra.
67. 654 F.2d at 926.

For a discussion of the Vaughn index, see notes

50-58 and accompanying text supra. The Lame court noted that the public
affidavit stated only "the general basis of the FBI's objections to" disclosure.

654 F.2d at 925.
68. 654 F.2d at 927. The majority stated:
Once the government admitted to possessing interview forms with any
of these informants, it would be revealing the very information it
claimed to be exempt-the identities of confidential sources. And since
all information provided by a confidential source is exempt, the possibility exists that even the most cursory description of the contents
of the interview form would, if the source was confidential, reveal
protected information.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. For a discussion of the Phillippi standard, see notes 55-57 and
accompanying text supra. The court qualified its conclusion by stating that
the "public affidavit was sufficient to meet the Phillippi standard as expressed
in Ferr." 654 F.2d at 927 (emphasis added). For the Third Circuit's articulation of the standard in Ferri, see note 58 supra.
71. 654 F.2d at 927.
72. Id. With the benefit of a Vaughn-type affidavit, the court stated that
"the district court would have had before it the necessary ingredients to rule
on the exemptions claimed, and we then would have been in a better position
to review those rulings." Id. The court further stated that "[e]ach document
and its asserted exemption must be individually explained in terms of privacy
and confidentiality." Id.
The issue of whether the interview forms come within the meaning of
"investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" was not contested by the parties. Id. at 922 n.5.
73. Id. at 928.
74. Id.
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to conduct a balancing test must be included.7 5 Turning to the confidentiality exemption, 70 Judge Garth concluded that the district court
must be given "detailed explanations" in order to determine 1) that
assurances of confidentiality were given to each source,7 7 and 2) the impact of any subsequent public disclosures made by the source.7 8 While
acknowledging the onerous burdens that befall agencies and courts faced
with a demand for disclosure, 79 Judge Garth concluded that the procedure employed in Lame did not provide the district court with the
information essential to its ruling.80
Judge Dumbauld concur-ed with the majority's conclusion that the
case should be remanded for further consideration 81 but disagreed with
the standards to be applied on remand.82 It was his contention that the

majority's specifications for both the FBI and the district court were
"unduly and needlessly burdensome and impracticable." 83 Judge Dumbauld stated that the impact of subsequent public disclosures on con-

fidentiality should not be "a significant and indispensable element" for
the district court's determination of the validity of the confidentiality
75. Id. The Lame court indicated that this should include "an explanation of why in each case disclosure would result in embarrassment or harassment" and a discussion of the "impact" of subsequent public disclosures on the
privacy interest. Id. The court also noted that the FBI's explanation of the
results of disclosure should have addressed the impact of Fineman's trial and
the Cianfrani change of Plea Proceedings on the issue. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court found that the government's "sampling technique" of
providing representative documents with its affidavit was inadequate. Id.
Judge Garth observed that if a district court decides to examine only a sampling
or portion of the documents, it alone must choose the sample. Id. at 928
n.1l.
78. Id. at 928.
79. Id. at 929. The Lame court expressed its concern over the expenditure of the FBI's "sorely needed resources, not to deal with the burgeoning
problem of crime . . .but to devote a large number of hours of exacting labor
to sorting out affidavits." Id. The majority further noted that the FOIA, as
construed in Lame, imposed an added burden on "already overworked" trial
courts. Id. In addition, the court emphasized that the prospect of having
affidavits made public might inhibit the future cooperation of informants. Id.
The court concluded by stating its hope that Congress "will attempt to accommodate the concerns which we have expressed." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 930 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Dumbauld noted that the district court's ruling could not be upheld
because it had made no findings on assurances of confidentiality and because
it did not have access to all of the documents. Id. Judge Dumbauld also concurred with the majority's position regarding the exemption of all information
furnished by a confidential source. Id. at 930 n.l (Dumbauld, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 930 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id.
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exemption.8 4 He also disputed the majority's ruling that the FBI and
the district court must "deal in detail with eveiy document produced for
in camera examination." 85 Judge Dumbauld stated that, without a
clear command in the FOIA or in case law N for the level of documentation required by the majority, "the FBI should be permitted to fight
crime ... rather than to serve as a librarian," 87 and that the judiciary
should likewise be freed of the task of sifting "through mountainous
haystacks of triviality." 88
An analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion reveals a thorough survey
of FOIA litigation procedures 89 and the nature of the privacy 0 and
confidentiality provisions 01 of the investigatory records exemptions.
Notwithstanding this extensive treatment of the law, the Lame court
proceeded to impose requirements that unnecessarily increase the burdens
84. Id. at 931 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Dumbauld stated that "the nature or extent of the disclosures at trial
or plea is utterly irrelevant to the confidentiality vel non of communications
previously made." Id. at 930 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). He stated that this determination should be made upon "the totality
of the circumstances." Id. at 931 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). judge Dumbauld further stated that, once made, the finding
of confidentiality is "fixed in concrete" and the information "remains exempt
from disclosure under FOIA whatever public proclamation of the identical
material may be made thereafter." Id. at 930 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Judge Dumbauld emphasized that, in some cases, the need for exemption of a document might be
"evident at a glance," and added that, where documents might display "identical ground[s]" warranting nondisclosure, categorical groupings should suffice,
without the need for individual annotations. Id. at 931-32 (Dumbauld, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Id. at 932 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For the majority's conclusion regarding the legislative history and the case law,
see notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra.
87. 654 F.2d at 932 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Dumbauld stated:
Where the enactments of Congress or precedents in the jurisprudence of this Court do not clearly command otherwise, the FBI
should be permitted to fight crime by investigating violations of
federal law rather than to serve as a librarian to furnish criminals a
complete account of the evidence in the government's possession
demonstrating their criminality, or to conduct historical research for
the benefit of journalists seeking to spread the slime of scandal and
sensationalism throughout the land for monetary gain."
1(d.

88. Id.
89. For a discussion of the court's review of FOIA procedures, see note
61 and accompanying text supra.
90. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the privacy provision,
see note 62 and accompanying text supra.
91. For the court's discussion of the confidentiality provision, see notes
63-65 and accompanying text supra.
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on agencies complying with the FOIA, 92 without basis in precedent 93 and
despite its own misgivings.94 Although a district court's determination
of whether documents fall within the privacy or confidentiality provisions is dependent upon a number of factors, 95 it is submitted that the
relevant data for this determination may often be apparent from the
documents themselves.9 Therefore, the Lame court properly ruled that
all documents being withheld must be made available to the district
court judge, 97 but needlessly expanded its holding to require a detailed
in camera Vaughn index for every document. 98 This latter requirement
is unnecessary unless the reasons for a claimed exemption can only be
made clear through this type of index. 99
92. See 654 F.2d at 928; notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
93. It is submitted that the court has gone beyond the requirements of
Phillippi (the only other extraordinary documents case), which was adopted
by the Third Circuit in Ferri. For a discussion of Phillippi, see notes 54-58
and accompanying text supra. The standard set forth in Phillippi does not
require the in camera affidavits to have the detail and sophistication of a
Vaughn index. See notes 51-58 and accompanying text supra. The Philippi
court primarily addressed the requirements for a public affidavit. 546 F.2d at
1013. It is arguable that, because the Phillippi decision came out of the
same circuit that decided Vaughn, the Phillippi court would have clearly
specified that it would require a Vaughn index for in camera affidavits, if it
had so intended. The absence of any mention of Vaughn with respect to the
in camera affidavit seems to clearly indicate that the Phillippi court had no
intention of extending Vaughn to an extraordinary documents case.
94. For a discussion of the Lame court's concerns with the "problems
spawned" by the FOIA, see note 79 supra. It is submitted that the majority
ruling was made as a form of protest. The Lame decision could be viewed
as a challenge to Congress; the court has made agency compliance with the
FOIA so cumbersome that Congress may be forced to amend it again.
95. For a discussion of these factors, see notes 29-39 and accompanying
text supra.
96. See 654 F.2d at 931 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part); note 85 supra. For example, a 302 may include, within the record
of an interview, a transcribed assurance of confidentiality given by the interviewer to the interviewee. It is submitted that in this situation an explanation of this assurance through an affidavit would be superfluous.
97. For a discussion of this aspect of the majority's holding, see note 61
and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of the detailed explanations required by the majority,
see notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 96 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the
holding could have been more flexible in order to accommodate the variety of
documents a district court may encounter. The majority could have appropriately relegated the necessity of a Vaughn-type in camera affidavit to the
district judge's discretion, as it did his access to documents. It is further submitted that the analysis of the impact of a person's subsequent public disclosures on his privacy and confidentiality interests is an extremely difficult task
which will require agencies to engage in needless hypothetical formulations.
It is suggested that the majority's inclusion of the impact requirement
with respect to confidentiality is inconsistent with its statement that once a
finding is made that a source in a criminal investigation was given an assurance of confidentiality, "all information that source has provided is exempt from
disclosure." See 654 F.2d at 924.
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It is also suggested that the Lame court's determination that all information provided by a confidential source is exempt from disclosure 100
was adopted summarily without adequate treatment of the split in authority on this issue. Judge Garth endorsed the Lesar view without any
discussion or analysis of precedent favoring the plain-meaning application of the statutory language.'O' It is submitted that, in light of the
FOIA's emphasis on disclosure 102 and the narrow construction to be
given to its exemptions, 0 3 the plain-meaning approach is preferable to
the Lesar view. 1°4
The impact of this decision will undoubtedly be felt most strongly
by government agencies attempting to assert exemptions to requests for
disclosure under the FOIA. 105 The Lame court has established very
specific guidelines for determining the validity of claimed privacy and
confidentiality exemptions under the FOIA and there is no longer any
doubt as to what the public and private affidavits must contain. 1°6 However, given the burdensome nature of these guidelines and the fact that
the Lame decision further exacerbates the subtle conflict in the circuits
regarding the extent of disclosure of information not given only by a
confidential source, it is apparent that these issues can only be resolved
by clarification from Congress 107 or the Supreme Court.
Gayle Chatilo Sproul

100. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
101. See 654 F.2d at 924-25. The Lame court made reference to only two
cases on this point: Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) and Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1980). Id. The court
failed to address authority which appears to favor some disclosure. For a
discussion of those cases, see note 45 supra. It is suggested that the Third
Circuit should have conducted an independent determination of whether all
the information provided by a confidential source is to be exempted.
102. For a discussion of the basic purpose of the FOIA, see note 19 and
accompanying text supra.
103. Id.
104. In summarily accepting the Lesar approach, it is submitted that the
Lame court has nullified any chance for disclosure when: 1) limited revelation
would not identify the confidential source; and 2) the information disclosed
has been provided by someone other than the confidential source. It is submitted that disclosure in such cases would be in perfect harmony with the
spirit of the provisions of the FOIA since the Act itself provides for the
release of "reasonably segregable portion[s]" of documents that are otherwise
exempt. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
105. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
106. Id.
107. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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